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NOTES
Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts
I. INMODUCON

With increasing frequency attorneys are confronted with disputes
arising under commercial contracts which contain arbitration agreements. Before the attorney can advise the client as to his legal position and recommend a course of conduct, he must interpret the
effect of the arbitration agreement. Often the first question for the
attorney is whether the client (or, in turn, the opposing party) can
be forced to arbitrate. The answer depends upon whether agreements
to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable under the law applicable
to the transaction. Where both parties to the contract are citizens
of the same state, the answer is readily found since the arbitration
law of that state will govern the transaction. But in our increasingly
mobile society, a growing number of commercial contracts involve
parties of different states. In the disputes arising under many of
these contracts, federal diversity jurisdiction will lie. The major
problem faced by the attorney in such a case is whether the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the contract will be governed
by federal law or state law, since in many instances the two will be
diametrically opposed. Of course, if state law is found to govern the
diversity case, the enforceability question cannot be answered until
it is determined which of the two or more states' law applies. This
raises a conflicts choice of law question, with which this paper is not
directly concerned. The conflicts methods of choosing the state law
applicable to a transaction involving many states will be used only
as an illustration of a process which may also be useful in deciding
whether federal or state law should apply to a particular enforceability
problem in a diversity case.
A. The Problem of Characterization
In the past there has been no little disagreement in federal court
diversity cases as to which law governs specific enforcement of agreements to -arbitrate future disputes arising under a commercial contract.
Under the arbitration law of some jurisdictions specific enforcement
is possible, while under many others, it is not.' The determination of
1. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 3-201-226 (1946); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5001(2)
(1962); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Baldwin 1964) (prov'idiig' for specific
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-501 (1955) .(providing only for submission of existing disputes for arbitration)."
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which jurisdictions law should be applied thus becomes all important. The answer to this choice of law question will normally depend
upon whether arbitration is characterized as substantive or procedural
under federal law.
Traditionally matters of arbitration have been characterized as
procedural rather than substantive. 2 It was said that arbitration
relates to the remedy, and as such, is one of the modes of trial. 3 Under
standard conflicts rules, the law of the forum controls as to matters
of procedure and thus, in federal court diversity cases, it was initially
held that the federal law of arbitration governed. 4 Further justification for this application of federal arbitration law in such cases rested
on the characterization of arbitration as a matter of federal "general
law" under Swift v. Tyson.5

With the decisions in Erie6 and GuarantyTrust,7 it became apparent
that arbitration could no longer be automatically characterized as
procedural. It was not, however, until the decision in Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America8 in 1956 that the Supreme Court finally
directed that arbitration was to be characterized as substantive in
federal court diversity cases. This decision would appear to require
use of the arbitration law of the state wherein the federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction is located. Some federal courts, however, have utilized various methods to avoid the apparent mandate of
Bernhardt.9 In order to understand the reasoning and arguments
behind these developments, this characterization problem must be
viewed against a background of the general developments in substantive arbitration law.
B. Developments in Substantive Arbitration Law
At common law, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were held
unenforceable, even though nominal damages could be granted for
their breach. 0 The reason underlying the rule was that such an
agreement ousted the courts from jurisdiction. Since this was a
time when courts were struggling to establish their prestige, they quite
2. See, e.g., lied Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).

3. Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1864).
4. California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz Am. Co., 60 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1932); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (D.C.N.Y. 1926).
5. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1841). See text accompanying notes 28-31 infra.
6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. Guaranty-Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
8. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
9. See Part IV infra.
10. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., SrTmExs, Commcr.iA APBmArrTIONS AN ANDAnns, §§ 22-23 (1930).
Section 22 states in part: "Statements recur many times in common law cases to
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naturally condemned the use of a practice which failed to recognize
them as the final authority in the settlement of legal disputes. 2 The
courts, however, have long since achieved their quest for prestige in
the adjudication process. Moreover, expanded commercial activity
has resulted in an increased number of disputes, leading eventually to
hopelessly crowded court dockets. Recognizing that arbitration is an
effective way of reducing the number of disputes requiring litigation,
many states have altered the common law rule of revocability of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes, and, by statute, have made
such agreements specifically enforceable.' 3
Another statute, making agreements to arbitrate future disputes
irrevocable, is the United States Arbitration Act,14 enacted by Congress
in 1925. At first the availabilty of the act, either specifically to enforce
agreements to arbitrate under section 4,15 or to stay legal proceedings
the effect that revocable future disputes clauses are 'contrary to public policy,' and
'invalid'; that they are 'not binding upon the parties'; that they are 'unenforceable' or
'void.' Statements also frequently appear to the effect that a party who is aggrieved
by the breach of such an agreement can maintain an action for damages. So few
cases, however, have involved such an action that if there is such a rule of law
it rests upon this popular acclaim."
As stated in Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858) "It is well settled that
courts of equity will never entertain a suit to compel parties specifically to perform
an agreement to submit to arbitration. . . . To do so, would bring such courts in
conflict with that policy of the common law which permits parties in all cases to
revoke a submission to arbitration already made. This policy is founded in the
"
obvious importance of securing fairness and impartiality in every judicial tribunal ..
See also Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (No. 14065), (C.C. Mass. 1845).
The idea that an agreement to arbitrate ousted the courts from jurisdiction dates
back to dicta in Vynior's Case, 4 Coke 80 (pt. 8), 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609)
where Lord Coke held that an agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration could be
revoked at the will of either party.
12. At the time when Coke's "ousting the courts of jurisdiction" idea was first
utilized, this was indeed the case. However, this reason for denying the enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate was continually used by the courts, long after it ceased
to exist. It was not until Lord Campbell's decision in Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L. Cas. 811,
10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1855), that the English courts gave effect to an agreement to
refer a dispute to arbitration. This view, however, was not adopted by the American
courts and it was not until statutory modification that the rule was changed. See
statutes cited note 1 supra.
13. See statutes cited note I supra.
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). Section 2 of the act provides: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising-out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and .enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
15. Section 4 of the act provides in part: "A party aggrieved by the alleged
failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any court of the United States which,. save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under the judicial code at law, in equity, or in
admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
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on the dispute pending their arbitration under section 3,16 was limited
by the courts.' 7 They soon realized the act's advantages, however, and
began applying it in federal diversity cases, even though relevant state
law made such agreements to arbitrate revocable. 8 The Bernhardt
decision appeared to preclude application of the act in a large number
of federal court cases when the jurisdictional basis was diversity. 19
To prevent this emasculation of the effectiveness of the act some
lower federal courts have construed the act as creating federal substantive law under the commerce clause which applies to "contracts
evidencing a transaction involving commerce," regardless of the Erie
and GuarantyTrust requirements.m
The consideration of the problem at hand is threefold: (1) to
review the development of arbitration in the federal courts in light
of the changing federal policies toward arbitration; (2) to point out
how previous characterization of arbitration as substantive or procedural has thwarted judicial consideration of the policy issues involved;
and (3) to investigate the extent to which current federal policy, as
expressed in the Arbitration Act, constitutionally could, and realistically should, be applied in diversity cases, and the problems raised by
such application.
II. F DERAL ARBrrATiON LAW PmoR TO Em.
A. Prior to the Adoption of the United States Arbitration Act
Until 1924 the few Supreme Court decisions characterizing arbitration treated it as essentially a procedural matter. In Reckers v.
Fowler,2 ' decided in 1864, the parties before the court agreed to submit
their dispute to a referee. The referee's decision was reported to the
court and entered by the clerk as a judgment. This judgment was
challenged on the basis that the court had no authority to settle the
dispute in such a manner. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, upheld
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in such agreement."
16. Section 3 of the act provides: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of
the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration."
17. See part IV infra.
18. Infra note 76.
19. See part IV infra.
20. Infra note 76.
21. Supra note 3.
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the judgment, stating that "a trial by arbitrators appointed by the
court, with the consent of both parties, was one of the modes of
prosecuting a suit to judgment ...."22
Although at the time of the Heckers decision it was settled arbitration law that agreements to arbitrate future disputes were revocable,
the lower federal courts were faced with a problem in applying this
law to cases where jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. The Rules of Decision Act 23 required that "the laws of the
several states ...be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in
the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." Moreover,
the Conformity Act,24 in effect, further required that the procedure
followed in a federal court diversity case be "as near as may be" to
that followed by the state in which the federal court is located. Thus
it seemed that even if the Rules of Decision Act did not require state
law to govern arbitration issues in a federal court diversity suit based
on a state cause of action, the Conformity Act did, since arbitration
is essentially procedural. The lower federal courts were able to circumvent these problems through the use of two distinct theories.
1. Characterizationof Arbitrationas Procedural.-Applicationof the
Rules of Decision Act could be avoided and federal arbitration law
applied, by characterizing arbitration as procedural and utilizing the
conflicts rule that procedural matters are governed by the law of the
forum. But the problem of the requirements of the Conformity Act
still existed. The courts were able to avoid the application of this
act, however, since its requirements were inapplicable in equity suits25
and specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement required an
action in equity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Pusey & Jones v.
Hanssen26 held in 1923 "that a remedial right to proceed in a fed,,7
eral court sitting in equity cannot be enlarged by state statute ....
22. Supra note 3, at 128.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1948).
24. 17 Stat. 197 (1872). Section 5 of that act provided:
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in

"That the practice,

other than equity and admiralty

causes in the circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform, as near as
may be to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the
time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or
district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding; Provided,
however, That nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence under the
laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof."
25. The act specifically provided that the provisions were inapplicable in equity

and admiralty suits. 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
26. 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
27. Id. at 497. In California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz Am. Co., supra
note 4, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court order compelling
arbitration under state law, holding that arbitration was a matter of procedure and
that the law of the forum applied. Citing Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra note 26,
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2. Characterizationof the ArbitrationAct as FederalGeneral Law.The majority of federal courts based their use of federal arbitration law
on another line of reasoning. In Swift v. Tyson, the Court interpreted
the Rules of Decision Act to require federal court application of state
law only when the question involved state statutory or decisional law

regarding matters of purely local concern. The act did not apply to
litigation on "contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature,
the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in

the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and

doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." 29 Several lower federal courts
seized upon the language of Swift v. Tyson and applied federal arbitra-

tion law in diversity cases as a matter of "general law," thereby
avoiding problems in application of the Rules of Decision and Conformity Acts.30
When in 1924 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its characterization of
arbitration as essentially procedural in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit

Co.31 the inconsistency of the lower federal courts' logic became

manifest. The Supreme Court's characterization at the same time

made the lower court's characterization of arbitration as a matter of
federal general law highly untenable. This, nevertheless was the
confusing and incongruous situation that developed.

B. After the Adoption of the United States Arbitration Act
The passage of the United States Arbitration Act32 in 1925 created
additional problems in determining what the federal law of arbitration

was and the extent of its application. Section 3 of the act provided for
a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration, where the contract
the court found the Conformity Act to be inapplicable since application of the California statute making arbitration agreements specifically enforcable would have broadened federal equity jurisdiction. See also Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (D.C.N.Y.
1926).
28. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
29. Id. at 18.
30. See, e.g., Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405 (9tlh Cir. 1923);
Michell v. Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1898); Rae v. Luzerne, 58 F.2d 829
(D.C. Pa. 1932); Jefferson Fire Ins. Co. v. Bierce & Sage Inc., 183 Fed. 588 (E.D
Mich. 1910).
31. 264 U.S. 109 (1924). This was an admiralty case where one of the parties to
a charter agreement petitioned a New York state court for an order compelling arbitration pursuant to a clause in the contract. Although the New York statute provided
for specific enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate, the Court of Appeals
of New York held it inapplicable since admiralty cases are governed by federal law
under U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that New York could constitutionally apply its arbitration law as a matter
of procedure since arbitration deals only with the remedy and does not attempt to
modify substantive admiralty law.
32. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947), quoted in note 14 supra.
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in dispute contained an agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Section
4 provided for specific enforcement of such an agreement. These
provisions reflected complete reversal of prior federal arbitration
policy favoring revocability of agreements. However, it was section
2, defining the scope of application of the act, which created problems.
This section extended the act to maritime contracts and "contracts
evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Although there was
no problem in defining the extent of the application of the act to
admiralty cases, the situation was otherwise in non-admiralty commercial contract cases. 33 Did the use of the language "contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" indicate merely the
basis of congressional authority for passage of the act, or did this
language require that the disputed contract constitute interstate
transaction before the provisions of the act applied? If the latter
were the correct interpretation, how were the courts to determine
when a contract evidenced a transaction involving commerce? Was
it even necessary to have interstate contract before the stay provision
of section 3 could be applied, since this was essentially nothing more
than a procedural rule? The only available Supreme Court decision
concerning the application of the act was the Court's 1932 decision
in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus. 34 This, however, was an admiralty
case in which the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the
act, declared its provisions to be procedural since the act in no way
deprived the parties of their rights under federal admiralty law. This
decision was of little aid in defining the scope of the act in nonadmiralty cases, leaving this problem largely to the determination
of the lower federal courts. The results, as will be seen, were far

from uniform.
In general, it can be said that the scope of the act in non-admiralty
cases was severely limited. A majority of the courts required diversity
of citizenship, the proper jurisdictional amount, and a contract
evidencing a transaction that involved commerce, before the provisions
of the act could be applied. 35 In addition, most of these courts placed
a restrictive definition on the term "contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce. 3 6 Some courts surmounted what they evidently
33. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act makes the act specifically applicable to "any
maritime transaction." In order to apply the act to a commercial contract, however,
the contract must be found to evidence a transaction involving commerce.
34. 284 U.S. 263 (1932).

35. See, e.g., Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004
(2d Cir. 1933); In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1929); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep

Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930). See also Note, Availability of Provkional
Bemedies in Arbitration Proceedings, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 638 (1940); Note, Arbitration
Case Law of the Last Decade, 26 VA. L. REv. 327, 340 (1940).
336. See, e.g., In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Pa. 1935); The
Volsinio, 32 F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
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felt to be constitutional problems in applying federal law to state
contracts by characterizing some provisions of the act as procedural
and applying them regardless of whether an interstate contract was
involved.37 Under this reasoning, in the absence of an interstate
contract, a court would refuse to compel specific enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate under section 4, since to do so would be an
unconstitutional application of federal law to a matter governed by
the substantive contract law of the state. But, under the same theory,
the court would grant a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration under section 3, since this was merely an application of procedure
which in no way interfered with state substantive law.
It is apparent that the problem of characterization of arbitration
existed in the pre-Erie analysis of arbitration statutes just as it did in
the analysis of common law arbitration. The Supreme Court had
characterized arbitration as procedural in both the Atlantic Fruit and
Dreyfus cases in upholding application of the New York and United
States arbitration statutes. But the approach taken by the lower
federal courts seems to have relied on the premise that not all aspects
of arbitration law are procedural, and that in some situations the
application of federal arbitration law amounts to an unconstitutional
preemption of a state's right to apply its substantive law to legal
relations created by the authority of that state.

III.

FEDERAL ABIrrRATION LAW FROM EmE TO BERNHAIDT

The 1938 decision of the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
did not solve the lower federal court's problems in applying federal
arbitration law, but, instead, merely altered the approach to these
problems. Erie's redefinition of the word "laws," as used in the Rules
of Decision Act, precluded application of federal "general law" in
diversity cases.38 The federal courts, no longer able to apply federal
arbitration law as "general law" in diversity cases, could justify its
application only by characterizing arbitration as a matter of procedure,
thus governed by the law of the forum. However, there had also
been changes in the standard for determining what federal courts
could do in the name of procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, enacted in 1938 pursuant to a 1934 enabling act, 39 were,
37. See, e.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d
297 (2d Cir. 1934). For a good discussion of these two views pertaining to the
scope of § 3 of the act see Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp.
364 (D.C. Neb. 1948).
38. In Erie the Supreme Court held that application of federal substantive law to a
state cause of action in federal court on diversity jurisdiction violated both the equal
protection clause and the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). "Be it enacted . . . that the Supreme Court of the
United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district
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in effect, held by the Supreme Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.40 to
to repeal the Conformity Act. It thus appeared that the Rules of
Decision Act, even as interpreted by Erie, did not preclude federal
courts from applying their own procedure in diversity cases. This
however, was somewhat limited by the Supreme Court's decision in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 41 in 1945, which indicated that a federal
court was precluded from applying its procedural rules in a diversity
case when to do so would lead to an outcome different from that which
would have resulted had the case been decided in a state court.4
This led to a somewhat different application of federal arbitration law
than had been the case before Erie. A summary of the post-Erie
federal court arbitration decisions before the Supreme Court's decision
in Bernhardt,43 illustrates how, for the most part, courts continued to
ignore the real issues when characterizing and applying arbitration
law in federal court diversity cases."
Although the basis of federal court jurisdiction in the cases arising
during this period is not always discernible, for purposes of this
discussion the cases will be divided into three main categories: those
apparently based on diversity jurisdiction, those apparently based on
federal question jurisdiction, and those based on admiralty jurisdiction.
A. Diversity Cases
During the period between the Supreme Court's decisions in Erie
and Bernhardt,the United States Arbitration Act came into wider use
in the lower federal courts. Most courts now applied the stay provisions of section 3 even when the contract did not evidence a transaction involving commerce, 45 reasoning that the section 3 stay provision,
being essentially procedural, was not limited by the section 2 requirement of a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.4
In contrast to this interpretation of section 3, most courts continued
to require a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
before granting specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes under section 4.47 The result was that there were few
courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil
actions at law."
40. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
41. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

42. Id. at 109.
43. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
44. See text accompanying notes 45-52 infra.
45. See, e.g., Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943);
Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., supra note 37.
46. Cases cited supra note 37.
47. See, e.g., Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb.
1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., .74 F.
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cases where arbitration agreements were specifically enforced under
section 4. Even if the disputed contract evidenced interstate commerce, there was no guarantee of specific enforcement under section
4.48 In Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson,49 where the disputed contract
was found to evidence a transaction involving commerce, the court
found that the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate was
governed by the United States Arbitration Act rather than by
Kentucky law. The court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the
act had legislated within its constitutional domain and had declared as
a matter of substantive law that such agreements were enforceable.
Although previous cases had held that section 3, as opposed to section
4, was procedural, Kentucky River Mills was apparently the first case
to distinguish the application of sections 3 and 4 on the ground that
specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate is a matter of
substantive law. Two subsequent cases, although not suits for specific
enforcement under section 4, nevertheless buttressed the reasoning
that, absent a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,
Congress had no constitutional authority to regulate the enforceability
of arbitration agreements. In Tejas Development Co. v. McGough
Bros., 0 suit was brought in the federal district court to enforce an
award rendered pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in a
contract for grading of streets and building of houses. Part of the
prayer was for reformation of the contract on the basis of mistake.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district judge's
determination that the United States Arbitration Act was controlling
on the grounds that the validity of the awards and the binding effect of
the agreement to arbitrate were both matters of state substantive law,
and that the awards, if invalid under state substantive law, could not
be enforced in federal court under authority of the United States Arbitration Act. In United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp.,51 the
Supp. 85 (D. Minn. 1947). See also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Harrisons &
Crosfield, 204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1953) (granting motion to compel arbitration under
§ 4 without discussing whether the contract evidenced a transaction involving commerce). Cf. McElwee-Courbis Const. Co. v. Rife, 133 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. Pa.
1955) (granting motion to compel arbitration under § 4 as a matter of procedure
without regard to requirement that contract involve commerce). See also Sturges &
Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CoNmT. PRoB. 580 (1952); Comment, Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts Under The U.S. Arbitration Act, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 218 (1948).
48. Before specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate will be compelled under
§ 4 the party seeking arbitration must have complied with all the "initiatory steps."
Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., supra note 47.
49. 65. F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946). This dispute again came before the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals seven years later but the same issues were not treated by
the court. See Kentucky River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953).
50. 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947)
51. 165 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948).-
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with enforcement of
an award rendered pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate disputes concerning fuel gas prices under a contract of sale. The court enforced the
award, citing West Virginia decisions without discussion of the United
States Arbitration Act. Although the arguments used in these two
cases were far from universally accepted, they did indicate that courts
were beginning to deal with the real issues involved in the application
of federal arbitration law. Rather than merely declaring that it was
necessary to have a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce before section 4 of the act applied, these cases affirmatively
recognized that some aspects of arbitration law were substantive and
could not constitutionally be applied in diversity cases under the Erie
doctrine absent some other element in the dispute giving Congress a
right to regulate. In all fairness, it must be pointed out that the
scarcity of such reasoning can be partially attributed to52 the lack of
diversity cases where specific enforcement was sought.
B. FederalQuestionJurisdiction
1. Generally.-When jurisdiction is based on a federal cause of
action, the constitutional problems of Erie are not present. Thus there
is no need to characterize particular aspects of arbitration as substantive or procedural for purposes of determining the applicable
law in a federal court. Two cases decided during this period seem
to support this analysis. In Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrisons
& Crosfield5 3 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted specific
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate under section 4 without
discussing whether the dispute involved a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce. In Wilko v. Swan,- the Second
Circuit, in an action under the Securities Act, granted a stay pending
arbitration under section 3, referring to arbitration as a form of trial,
but ignoring any procedural-substantive distinction between section 3
and section 4.
2. Labor Cases.-The labor law cases in federal courts during this
period present a unique set of problems. Actions in which arbitration questions arose were of two types. The first involved suit by an
employee for wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.55 Section
16(b) of that act provides for the employer's liability, for failure to
pay the minimum wage and authorizes an action to recover on such
52. Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts:
Erie v. Tompkins, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 74 (1953).
53. Supra note 47.
54. 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
55. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
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liability in any court of competent jurisdiction. 56 The second type involved actions by either the employee or the employer to enforce the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act.57 Another factor rendering

labor law cases unique was the exception of employment contracts of
workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from application

of the United States Arbitration Act as provided for in section 1 of that

act.58
The problems involved in analysis of the application of federal

arbitration law to agreements to arbitrate in such cases were twofold:
First, did section 1 of the United States Arbitration Act prevent the

act's application to the particular case? Second, if section 1 did not
prevent the act's application, what was the extent of this application?

As to the first question, available cases during this period indicate a
split of authority.59 It is the second question however, which is of

primary concern. Of the cases during this period in which federal
arbitration law was applied, one was brought under the Fair Labor

Standards Act 6° and two were brought under the Labor Management

Relations Act.61 In all three of these cases, the section 3 stay provision was characterized as procedural and thus applicable, even in

the absence of a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. Language in one of these cases further indicated that the

section 4 provision for specific enforcement was substantive law, thus
56. "(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this
Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,
and in an additional amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability
may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction ..
"
57. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141-88 (1964). "See. 301 (a) Suits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
58. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947). " § 1 . . . nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
59. See, e.g., United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Inc., 168
F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. &
Elec. By. Employees, 106 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1952) (finding the Arbitration Act
inapplicable to labor disputes). Cf. Tenney Eng'r Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207
F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (finding the act applicable to the labor dispute involved
despite § 1). See also Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp.
851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying the act to a labor dispute without discussion of the
applicability of § 1); Burstein, The United States Arbitration Act-A Reevaluation, 3
VILL. L. REv. 125 (1958).
60. Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., supra note 45.
61. Tenney Eng'r Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, supra note 59; Lewittes & Sons v.
United Furniture Workers, supra note 59.
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requiring a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce before federal law could be applied.2
From the few labor cases decided during this period, it appears
that even when the case involved federal question jurisdiction, the
application of substantive federal arbitration law was limited to contracts which Congress would otherwise have had a right to regulate.
Implicit in these decisions was the proposition that federal question
jurisdiction extended only to the labor law aspects of the disputed
contracts. It would appear that once there is federal regulation of the
provisions of a labor contract, federal law could and should be held
to govern all aspects of that contract, including its enforcement. This
question appears to have been subsequently resolved by the Supreme
Court's 1957 decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills6
decided after Bernhardt. Interpreting section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Court held that section to be more than
jurisdictional. Rather, it "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law for the enforcement of those collective bargaining
agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance
of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements."64 The Court further stated that "it is not uncommon for fed615
eral courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned."
In forming this "301 law," the federal courts are to be guided by the
general policies of the national labor laws. Lincoln Mills makes it
clear that in a section 301 suit involving arbitration, federal law
governs. The position of the United States Arbitration Act on this
matter is, however, unclear. Is this one of the statutes to which
federal courts must look as expressing the general policy of the
federal labor laws? 66 A majority of courts, on the authority of Lincoln
Mills, have decided arbitration issues in labor disputes without ref62. "Then the second section proceeds to lay down a rule of substantive law regarding the validity of an agreement for arbitration in case of any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. Congress was here
making a rule concerning subject matter within its own constitutional legislative authority. It was not seeking to confer validity to arbitration agreements generally a
matter outside the scope of federal powers. Instead it picked out two important
classes of transactions within the federal legislative domain and declared the effect of
arbitration clauses in agreements concerned therewith." Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., supra note 45, at 5.
63. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
64. Id. at 451.
65. Id. at 457.
66. See Local 19, Warehouse Workers v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776
(6th Cir. 1956); Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85
(1st Cir. 1956). (Both of these 301 cases applied the Arbitration Act as substantive
federal labor law). See also Note, Federal Enforcement of Grievance Arbitration
Provisions Under the Doctrine of Lincoln Mills, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1139 (1958).
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erence to the Arbitration Act.6 7 Even so, it appears that there would
be no constitutional problem in applying the Arbitration Act to a
federal question suit under section 301.68
C. Admiralty Jurisdiction
In cases involving an admiralty claim the Constitution apparently
requires federal courts to apply federal law.69 Thus the Erie problems
of substance and procedure are absent. Furthermore, section 2 of the
United States Arbitration Act provides for application of that act to a
maritime transaction, notwithstanding commerce considerations."° The
admiralty cases decided during this period indicate no problem in
granting the specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under
section 4.71
An interesting problem exists however in admiralty cases litigated
in state courts. Under the Constitution and the Judiciary Act, state
courts have concurrent in personam jurisdiction over maritime causes
of action, but must apply federal substantive admiralty law. State law,
however, governs matters of procedure. If section 4 of the United
States Arbitration Act is characterized as substantive, must a state
court, hearing an admiralty case, grant specific enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate, when state arbitration law provides for revoca-72
bility of such an agreement? In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic FruitCo.,

decided before enactment of the Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court
characterized arbitration as procedural in upholding the application
of New York arbitration law to an admiralty case litigated in a New
York court. At the time of the decision, the New York law provided
for irrevocability of agreements to arbitrate, while federal law provided that such agreements were revocable. Whether this case would
be authority today for a state court's refusal to specifically enforce an
arbitration agreement in an admiralty case is open to considerable
question.
67. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
68. In Scalzitti Co. v. Operating Eng'rs, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965), the court
upheld the union's contention that the Arbitration Act applied to § 301 suits against
the company's objection that such disputes are precluded from the act under § 1.
The court relied on the fact that the Supreme Court bad compelled arbitration in
Lincoln Mills without mentioning § 1 of the act even though the court of appeals in
Lincoln Mills had denied the application of the act under § 1.
69. "The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. It has also been said that the Erie doctrine
is irrelevant when the court is exercising admiralty jurisdiction, even when a state
created right is being enforced. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
70. See statute quoted in note 14 supra.
71. See, e.g., Albatross S.S. Co. v. Manning Bros., 95 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Stathatos v. Arnold Bernstein S.S. Corp., 87 Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
72. 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
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IV. BERNHARDT: SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROBLEMS
A. Bernhardt and Subsequent Developments
In 1956 the Supreme Court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America73 rendered its first decision concerning the scope of the application of the United States Arbitration Act in federal court diversity
cases. In a damages suit for wrongful discharge under an employment contract which was removed to a Vermont federal district court,
the defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration under section 3
of the act. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's holding that since the disputed contract did not evidence a
transaction involving commerce, the Erie doctrine required application
of Vermont law. The court of appeals held that section 3 of the act
applied as a matter of procedure even though the contract did not
involve commerce. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, stating the arbitration should be characterized as substantive
for Erie purposes, since the application of federal arbitration law would
lead to an outcome different from that which would be reached in a
a state court on the same cause of action. The Court further stated
that sections 1, 2, and 3 of the act are integral parts of the whole
and that the stay provision of section 3 reaches only those contracts
covered by sections 1 and 2. The majority felt that if they were to
hold otherwise, a constitutional question under Erie might be presented. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the concurring opinion, indicated that the act had no application in diversity cases, but expressed "no opinion on the constitutional question that would be
presented were Congress to make the Arbitration Act applicable to
such cases."7 4
The response of the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bernhardthas been anything but one of unanimous assent.
Of the circuits that have interpreted the effect of the Bernhardt decision on the application of the Arbitration Act in diversity cases,
only the First Circuit has apparently held that arbitration issues must
be governed by state law. 75 Most circuits have continued to apply
the act in diversity cases where the disputed contract has evidenced
a transaction involving commerce, on the theory that as to these contracts, Congress intended to enact federal substantive law.76 This
73. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
74. Id. at 208.
75. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960).

76. Metro Industrial Painting Co. v. Terminal Const. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.
1961); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959); American Airlines Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811
(6th Cir. 1959). See also Note, Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 468 (1963).
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theory views the constitutional problems referred to in Bernhardt as
arising only if the Arbitration Act is characterized as procedural, and
distinguishes Bernhardt on its facts, since the contract in that case
did not evidence a transaction involving commerce. Perhaps the
primary factor influencing the court's position is that the exclusion
of diversity cases from the act's coverage significantly, if not almost
totally, limits the effectuation of a policy which Congress intended to
implement by the passage of the act.
B. ProblemsPosedby Subsequent Developments
By characterizing the Arbitration Act as federal substantive law,
the lower federal courts have been able to avoid the Bernhardtlimitation of the act's application. But significant problems of constitutionality, jurisdiction, and policy remain.
1. ConstitutionalProblems.-Granted that Congress has the power
to regulate a transaction involving interstate commerce, to what extent
can Congress constitutionally prescribe federal substantive law governing a state contract, merely because the contract involves commerce and contains an arbitration agreement? Does federal law
govern the determination of which disputes are arbitrable under the
particular arbitration clause? Does federal law also govern the validity and construction of other elements of the contract containing
the arbitration agreement? These problems have been recognized by
some courts, but no definitive solution has been forthcoming from
the Supreme Court. The major issue considered by the lower federal
courts has been whether federal law controls in the determination
of these particular disputes that are arbitrable. Since Bernhardt, the
First, Second, Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have considered the
problem, with the majority of the cases arising in the Second Circuit.
The first case dealing with this question in the Second Circuit was
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire FabricsInc.,7 where the plaintiff
brought suit in a diversity action seeking damages for fraudulent
representation inducing it to enter into a contract to purchase a quantity of wool. The defendant, pursuant to section 3 of the Arbitration
Act, moved for a stay pending arbitration under a clause in the contract. The court, treating the arbitration clause as a separable part
of the contract, found that the illegality or alleged breach of the
container contract did not nullify the agreement to arbitrate. The
court held that federal law governed:
77. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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questions of interpretation and construction as well as questions of validity,
revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements ... since these two
types of legal questions are inextricably intertwined. 78

Applying federal law, the court found that the particular arbitration
clause was broad enough to include the issue of fraud in the inducement and granted the stay under section 3.
Following Lawrence, the Second Circuit in Metro Industrial Painting v. Terminal,79 a diversity case evidencing a transaction involving
commerce, granted the specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate under section 4 of the act. Judge Lumbard, however, in his concurring opinion, expressed concern over the majority's failure to define
precisely the scope of the application of federal law. The opinion
indicated that a close constitutional question may arise as to whether
Congress may regulate arbitration clauses in all contracts "affecting
commerce" or between parties "engaged in commerce," as those
phrases have been interpreted in other federal statutes. Lumbard,
agreeing with the majority that the Arbitration Act should not be
read so broadly, desired that the standard for determining whether
a contract was governed by federal law should be sufficiently definite
to permit parties to contemplate the application of federal law at the
time of contracting.
Since the decision in Metro, the Second Circuit has been confronted with few diversity cases involving a contract evidencing
commerce and containing an arbitration clause. In one the issue
was whether the arbitration clause was separable from the container
contract, thus authorizing arbitration of a dispute concerning alleged
fraud in the inducement.80 The issue was resolved81 by use of federal
law without reference to constitutional problems.
Two Third Circuit decisions since Bernhardt recognize the application of the Arbitration Act in diversity cases involving contracts
78. Id. at 409.
79. 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961).
80. In El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d
346 (2d Cir. 1961), the contract containing the arbitration clause also incorporated
a clause conditioning the seller's acceptance upon the bidders, providing guarantees
covering purchase price, performance bonds and insurance protection. The court of
appeals denied arbitration since the arbitration clause could not be separated from
the main contract. The main contract did not provide for arbitration of disputes
concerning performance until the threshold acts upon which acceptance was conditioned had been performed. The court distinguished Lawrence (which had held
the arbitration clause to be separable) on the basis that, under the circumstances in
that case, the parties had agreed to arbitrate the issue of fraud in the inducement.
81. See also World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethleham Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.
1965); In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961) (issue of separability
determined according to federal law).
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evidencing commerce, but are of little help in defining the constitutional scope of the application of the act.8
The First Circuit apparently felt it was confronted with the problem of the scope of the act in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
Refining Co. 83 The plaintiff brought a diversity suit in the federal
district court of Puerto Rico alleging that it had been fraudulently
induced into a contract with the defendant, and sought to rescind
the contract and to enjoin the defendant's action in a New York
federal court to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in the contract. Whether arbitration could be compelled depended upon the
scope of the arbitration clause and whether it was separable from
the container contract. Although both the arbitration law of New
York and Puerto Rico, and the federal act provided for specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, the court's problem was to determine which law should be applied in determining the separability
issue, which was the question that would ultimately govern the granting or denial of specific enforcement. The court indicated that the
federal rule of separability, as laid down in Lawrence, was the better
view, but felt constitutionally bound by Bernhardt to resolve the issue
in accordance with state law. The court held New York law applicable
since New York was the situs of both the execution and the intended
performance of the contract, and thus was the jurisdiction with the
most substantial contacts with the transaction. Under New York law
the arbitration clause was not separable, but the court further found
that since the plaintiff had failed to place the making of the contract in issue, it could not, under New York law, stay arbitration merely
by pleading fraud in the inducement. Consequently, arbitration was
compelled. This decision immediately raises the question whether
the court's reasoning would have been the same had not both New
York and Puerto Rican law provided for specific enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate. Since the court essentially treated the case
as involving a conflicts question, had New York and Puerto Rican law
not provided for specific enforcement, it may well have found that
the federal policy favoring arbitration was sufficiently strong to justify
adoption of the Second Circuit's reasoning in Lawrence.
In Ross v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,84 decided shortly
82. Monte v. Southern Delaware County Authority, 321 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1963)
(holding that federal law controls interpretation of the arbitration agreement but that
state law will be used since the contract specifically so directed); Kirschner v. West Co,,
185 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962) (holding that
the Arbitration Act applied to a diversity suit concerning a contract evidencing commerce). See also Kirschner v. West Co., 247 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd,
353 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1965) (confirming award made under arbitration agreement).
83. Supra note 75.
84. 236 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956).
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after Bernhardt, the Ninth Circuit found section 3 of the Arbitration
Act applicable in a diversity suit which involved a contract evidencing
commerce. The court stated, however, that the questions of whether
the contract presented an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and so,
what disputes were referable to arbitration, were governed by California law. The court held that the federal act should have no
more than the procedural effect of staying suit.
85
In American Airlines Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd.,
decided in 1959, the Sixth Circuit found that the act applied as a
matter of federal substantive law, but in effect, refused to apply the
separability theory to justify use of federal law in determining questions of interpretation, construction and validity, as well as revocability and enforceability. The court held that section 4 of the act
did no more than make arbitration agreements irrevocable where
they had previously been revocable. Furthermore, before the provisions of the act applied, both the container contracts and the arbitration clause must be valid and enforceable in accordance with standard
contract principles of both state and federal law.
On the whole, the cases dealing with the constitutional scope of
the Arbitration Act in diversity suits can perhaps be said to do so
only in an off-hand manner. Save for the reservation of Judge Lumbard in Metro, which at best merely alludes to a possible constitutional issue, the Second Circuit apparently sees no constitutional
restraint against the application of federal law. The First Circuit in
Lummus merely cites Bernhardt as requiring use of state law, without discussion of the constitutional question. Both the Sixth and
the Ninth Circuits strictly limit the application of federal law, but
do so without reference to a constitutional necessity for the limitation.
It appears for the most part that the courts do not feel that the
constitution offers a formidable restriction on the application of substantive federal arbitration law to contracts evidencing commerce.
2. JurisdictionalProblems.-Does the Arbitration Act, if it is federal
substantive law, confer a basis for independent federal question-jurisdiction in a federal court when an arbitr.tiTn agreement is contained
in a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce? Are the
state courts obligated to apply the act when confronted with such a
case?
There is considerable authority that the act does not furnish a
basis for federal question jurisdiction.8 The cases have so held con85. Supra note 76.
86. See, e.g., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., supra note 76. See
also Note, supra note 76.
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sistently, on the basis of the language of the act. The stay provision
of section 3 is available as a defense motion only in suits already
"proceeding... in any of the courts of the United States." 7 Section
4 provides for specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement upon
petition to "any court of the United States which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under the judicial code, at law, in
equity, or in admiralty of the subject matter of the suit arising out
of the controversy between the parties." 88 Furthermore, in Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,a9 the Supreme Court held that it was indeed
possible for a federal statute to create substantive rights without
affording a separate basis for jurisdiction. Thus, so far as available
authority indicates, the answer to this first question is settled in the
affirmative.
There is little authority either way on the proposition that the state
courts are obligated to apply the Arbitration Act to a contract evidencing commerce. Judge Medina, in Lawrence, appears to have
presumed that federal law was applicable in such cases in state
court.90 There is, however, no legislative history bearing on the question. As pointed out by one commentator, application of the act in
state courts would avoid the problem of forum shopping. Perhaps
the best solution would be to allow the states to apply their own
remedies, as long as they did not defeat the substantive rights created
under section 2 of the act. This solution, however, seems to beg the
question; namely, what is the scope of these substantive rights. Absent
a precise determination of this scope, a considerable difference of
opinion appears possible in the federal and state courts.
3. Policy Considerations.-To what extent do the answers to the
foregoing questions depend on the policy that parties entering into
a contract be able to define their respective rights and obligations at
the time of contracting? Should the fact that it is often impossible
to determine whether a contemplated contract will evidence a transaction involving commerce and will thus be governed by federal law,
preclude application of federal law to arbitration agreements contained in contracts created under state law? To what extent should
the choice of law governing a contract be decided by determining
which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the transaction.
Implicit in the Supreme Court's holding in Erie was the policy of
prevention of forum shopping, a practice which had plagued Swift
87. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1947).
88. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
89..291 U.S. 205 (1934).
90. 271 F.2d at 407.
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v. Tyson's futile attempt to create uniformity of the law in state and
federal courts. Criticism of the Court's grounding the decision in
Erie on the Constitution was immediately forthcoming. As summarized by one author, many felt that:
irrespective of the scope of the federal judicial power, Congress could
constitutionally prescribe substantive law that shall be applied by federal
courts, and that it would have been preferable to couch the Erie decision
in terms of policy rather than in terms of the demands of the Constitution,
since the basic issue was one of policy anyway, determinable without
reference to the Constitution. 91

An attitude such as this could well persuade the courts to de-emphasize the constitutional issues and place primary importance on policy
considerations in determining the scope of the Arbitration Act.
The circuit court diversity cases since Bernhardt have been concerned with three policy considerations: (1) the policy behind the
federal act to encourage arbitration of disputes in an effort to relieve
pressure on crowded court dockets, 92 (2) the Erie policy of insuring
like results in both federal and state courts, 93 (3) the conflict of laws
policy that a contract transaction should be governed by the law of
the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with the transaction.94 To these three policy considerations, a fourth should be added,
although it has not been considered extensively by the courts. This
is the conflict of laws policy of allowing the parties to a contract to
choose the law applicable to their contemplated contract, so long as
the law chosen has a reasonable relationship to the transaction. 95
In some situations there will be no conflict between these policies
and the court will have no difficulty choosing the applicable law
and incidental to this, determining the scope of the act. Such was
the case in Lummus, where the arbitration law of all the jurisdictions
involved favored arbitration and the four policy considerations could
be accommodated. The agreement to arbitrate was enforceable; the
decision of the federal court did not differ from that which would
have been rendered by a state court; and the law of the jurisdiction
having the most significant contacts with the transaction as well as
that chosen by the parties, was applied. However, in other cases,
like the American Airlines case, all of these policy considerations could
not be accommodated, and a choice had to be made. There the court's
91. Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 439 (1958).
92. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics Inc., supra note 76.
93. See, e.g., Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., supra note 75; Ross v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra note 84.
94. Ibid.
95. See Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion in Metro Industrial Painting Co. v.
Terminal, supra note 76, at 385.
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decision ultimately favored the policy of applying the law of the
place of the most significant contact with the transaction. The court
also accommodated the Erie policy of uniformity, although obviously
not following a policy favoring arbitration. In cases such as this,
where the policies conflict, courts will obviously decide the case in
such a manner as to encourage the policy which it feels to be most
important in the particular situhtion.
V.

CONCLUSION

From a chronological review of the history of the application of
federal arbitration law in federal courts, it is apparent that the courts
have long been plagued by the fine distinctions involved in characterizing arbitration as substantive or procedural for purposes of determining the scope of application of federal arbitration law. The

Supreme Court decision in Bernhardt went a long way in preventing
the use of the substantive-procedural characterization as a mere means
of justifying application of federal law. It emphasized that the characterization of arbitration is merely an aid in the process of determining
the situations to which federal law is properly applicable. Although
the existence of constitutional issues under Erie, which were involved
in the application of federal arbitration law to diversity cases, was
alluded to in Bernhardt, ihe courts since Bernhardt have begun to
look at the important policy considerations in determining the scope
of application of federal arbitration law. The very nature of arbitration precludes a wholly substantive or wholly procedural label for
Erie purposes. 96 The lower federal courts, in distinguishing Bernhardt
and applying the Arbitration Act as federal substantive law, recognized that Bernhardt's characterization of arbitration as wholly substantive for Erie purposes was inadequate. On the other hand, the
difficulty which federal courts have bad in determining the scope of
the Arbitration Act, once they have characterized it as substantive
law, illustrates that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's preclusion of the act's
application in diversity cases may not be completely erroneous.
Ultimately, the problem of determining the scope of federal arbitration law in diversity cases should be decided in the particular case as
a conflicts choice of law question. In each particular case the conflict96. Although arbitration is essentially procedural, under certain circumstances it
could affect the outcome of a particular dispute, and to that extent it is substantive.
It is the rule of law applied to a particular fact situation and directing a particular
result which is substantive. It is the method of applying the rule of law which is
procedural. The procedural rule should not itself direct the legal results which flow
from a particular fact situation. Arbitration does not actually direct how a particular
rule of law should be applied but rather is a procedure which directs that no rule of
law shall be applied. To the degree that arbitration results in a different result in a
particuar fact situation than that prescribed by the rule of law, it is substantive.
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ing policies, including the constitutional considerations, should be
weighed.9 7 The analysis of a case should proceed somewhat along
these lines: First, the court would determine the policy of both the
federal and state law of arbitration. If these policies do not conflict,
there is little reason to apply federal law. But if they do conflict, the
court must look to the interests of the state and federal jurisdictions
in applying its particular policy. For example, if the contract is in
the steel industry, there are obvious national interests which dictate
the enforcement of the federal policy. But, if the contract primarily
affects the state, even though it may involve commerce, the interest
of the state in applying its policy may be paramount. Finally, the
court would look to whether it is important for the parties to be able
to choose the applicable law and whether or not they did so.
It is recognized that this solution would not be an easy one to
administer, but it would at least be uniform in a general sense, and
one which would contend with the important factors involved in
the resolution of the problem. By resolving the question in the same
manner as a conflicts choice of law problem, the task of the attorney
attempting to define his client's legal position under a particular
contract containing an arbitration clause would probably be somewhat easier. As the situation now stands, the attorney has very little
in the way of rules to aid him in arriving at a decision. Under the
recommended solution he would at least have a reasonable basis for
predicting the law applicable to a particular transaction. Furthermore,
although the recommended solution does not afford complete aid, the
assistance it would provide is more than is available under the
present law.
JAmEs F. NooN¢y
97. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op. Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the
Supreme Court suggested that the choice of law determination in diversity cases
should be made on the basis of policy considerations after weighing the countervailing considerations. This case seems an obvious encroachment on the apparent
constitutional requirements of Ee.

